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Abstract 
 
This paper argues for the essentiality of recognition to redistributive theories of justice in 
order to sufficiently alleviate global poverty, a matter that within theories of international 
justice predominantly surrounds the question of responsibility. Through an investigation on 
the moral requirements and capabilities behind our global relationships, this paper assigns 
special responsibility to alleviate poverty to the affluent, defined as all those with relatively 
high standards of living who enjoy luxuries. Drawing on Pogge for evidence for a causal 
relationship between the poor and the affluent due to a shared world economic system 
elaborates the basis of claims for redistribution. However, the contemporary engagement in 
redistributive justice will be demonstrated to solely address the symptoms of poverty. The 
reason for this is claimed to lie in the world economic system’s impact on the value structure 
of the affluent in a way that makes them regard everything as depending on economic power. 
Thus the form redistribution takes is a purely economic redistribution. Due to this influence, 
the poor are merely cognitively recognised in their physical existence as suffering from lack 
of economic power but not as moral agents. By drawing on Honneth and Fraser, a moral form 
of recognition, namely equal status recognition, is introduced that proves to be an essential 
component of justice and moreover has the ability to alter the form of redistribution to what is 
labeled redistribution based on solidarity. As illustrated in a practical example on the 
Fairtrade model, this theoretical exchange of the underlying form of recognition that impacts 
that on the form of redistribution empowers the poor as granting them independent agency 
and ultimately enables redistribution based on solidarity to be more sufficient in addressing 
global poverty.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‘In 2000, more than 1,000 million people were below the $1 a day line for income poverty, 
itself often thought to be unrealistically low; comparable numbers were judged to be below 
minimum levels on measures such as adequate nourishment, and access to clean drinking 
water’.1 
– David Miller 
 
It is natural for work on global poverty to start by listing different data and statistics in order 
to give an account of the suffering of today’s world. However, stating that millions over 
millions of people are starving may make the suffering of the poor appear to be enormous but 
only seldom one can grasp its actual severity. Furthermore; as Julian Saurin shows, a great 
deal of data ‘is not only limited as a measure of the human condition, but often grossly 
misleads both the inquiry into, and the description of that condition, not least because of the 
tendency to fetishise the question of development’.2 What debates on global poverty are 
actually about - the quality of human life - is almost impossible to exercise.  
Due to this, this paper will follow Peter Singer and ‘begin with the assumption that suffering 
and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad’.3 There is no doubt that 
millions of people suffer and die from severe poverty; malnutrition and a lack of water every 
single day. The question what this state of affairs implies for the rest of us living on this 
planet; most of whom able to alleviate the situation; is the basis of an ongoing debate.  
Within international theories of justice the suffering of the poor seems to predominantly 
surround the question of responsibility. As Miller says, there is a large normative gap 
                                                          
1 Miller; D., National Responsibility (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 232. 
2 Saurin, J. ‘Globalisation, Poverty, and the promises of Modernity’ Milleninium Journal of International Studies, 
25 (1996), p. 662.  
3 Singer, P. Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), p. 231.  
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between ‘identifying a state of affairs as intolerable and identifying agents, individual or 
collective, who have a responsibility to remedy it’.4 The best account of this matter is 
captured in the world views of cosmopolitan and communitarian thinkers on the question of 
whom we grant morally equal standing and thus feel obliged to assist.  
Communitarians are of the opinion that the moral agent or bearer of rights has first and 
foremost obligations towards his fellow citizens and direct community; thus in its initial 
form is uniquely state-centric. Ethical cosmopolitanisms on the other hand see themselves as 
‘citizen of the world’ for which they extend their moral obligations to the global realm and 
claim that the interests of all persons should be given equal moral standing.5 
Despite engagement in this debate, redistributive justice has not shown to alleviate global 
poverty to any sufficient degree. Multiple reasons for this are given such as infrequent 
engagement in monetary donations by individuals to charities, administrative problems 
within aid organisations or corruptness of government elites in third world countries which 
may well be regarded as contributing factors.6 However, this dissertation will argue that 
even in a perfect and ideal world where redistribution could be exercised without any 
limitations, redistribution would be insufficient in addressing global poverty as it only 
addresses the symptom or representation of injustice not its actual cause.  
Arguing further that all theories of distributive justice are constituted by some form of 
recognition; the reason for this insufficiency is believed to be found in the underlying form 
of recognition that redistributive justice is based on.  
Hence, a form of recognition required to make redistribution sufficient will need to go 
beyond material redistribution. In accordance with this, this dissertation will attempt to 
                                                          
4 Miller, D. National Responsibility, p. 232.  
5 Erskine, T. ‘Normative IR Theory’, in International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity, edited by 
Dunne, T.; Kurki, M.; Smith, S. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 42-44. 
6 See Miller, National Responsibility, p. 232; Nagel, T. ‘Poverty and Food: why charity is not enough’ in Food 
Policy edited by Chris Brown and Henry Shue (1977) and Singer, Famine Affluence, p. 229-243. 
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answer the question: Can the underlying assumptions of redistributive forms of justice 
be addressed through a dialogue with theories of recognition? 
This will proceed in three sections; the focus of the first being on the basis for claims of 
redistributive justice. An investigation on the moral requirements and capabilities behind our 
global relationships shall assign special responsibility to alleviate poverty to the affluent 
people, defined as ‘all those with relatively high standards of living who enjoy luxuries’.7 
However, these will be shown to not solely be based on a shared humanity but on a deeper 
rooted outcome responsibility. It will be drawn on Thomas Pogge who brings evidence for a 
causal relationship between the poor and affluent, mainly due to a shared, but imposed, 
world economic system.8 Due to which; individuals, governments or international 
organisations feel obliged to redistribute part of their wealth in form of monetary donations 
and aid provisions. However, the contemporary engagement in redistributive justice will 
shown to be solely addressing the symptoms. 
In the hope that through a critique of contemporary redistribution the reason of the 
insufficiency can be identified, the second section will first of all consider the arguments of 
Sandel and Zizek who claim that the world economic system impacts on the value structure 
of the affluent in a way that makes them regard everything as depending on economic 
power. From this it will then be suggested that the poor are thus not accordingly recognised 
as having moral agency. Introducing Axel Honneth’s three inter-subjective patterns of 
recognition shall help to determine on which basis the poor are recognised by the affluent 
and how they ideally should be.9 Through Nancy Fraser, who promotes a dual-axis of justice 
in which both redistribution and recognition are co-fundamental, the paper hopes to gain 
                                                          
7 Lichtenstein, J. ‘Absence of an unfond heart: Why people are less giving than they might be‘, edited by Deen 
k. Chatterjee (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 76.  
8 Pogge, T. World Poverty and Human Rights – Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge, 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2002).  
9 Honneth, A. The Struggle for Recognition (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995). 
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evidence for the essentiality of recognition to justice and moreover a relation to 
redistribution.10 If this is found to be correct, it will be possible to alter the form of 
recognition which should ultimately alter redistribution in a way that it becomes sufficient in 
the address of world poverty.  
The final section will further help to reveal the hidden assumptions behind purely economic 
redistribution as well as the ability of modern capitalism for commodification of global 
poverty. Based on the theoretical establishment in the previous two sections; the weakness 
of a purely economic redistributive model will be illustrated on the practical example of 
Fairtrade; a model for redistribution of wealth by promoting products to consumers in the 
first world under the promise that the products were produced under fair working conditions 
and that the producers in poor countries will be given a fair share of the selling price. This 
section will conclude by bringing evidence for the change of redistribution through the 
consideration of recognition and thus will shown to result in a sufficient in the address of 
global poverty.  
 
                                                          
10 Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. Redistribution or Recognition? – A Political-philosophical Exchange (London, 
Verso, 2003).  
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SECTION ONE: THE BASIS OF REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 
‘Beyond the bland and superficial agreements that hunger and destitution should be ended, 
sceptical and self-seeking views are common. Poverty is indeed seen as a problem –for the 
poor. The rich and powerful often see no reason why they should help end distant poverty’.11 
– Onora O’Neil 
 
Introduction 
 
The following section will commence by showing that in debates regarding global poverty, 
tracing back the origins of responsibilities can present a real challenge. Whereas in former 
times interaction has been limited to state borders in the case of war and clear lines could be 
drawn; nowadays these lines become blurry as we are able of harming people across 
perceptible borders. With the help of Peter Singer it will be asked whether it is necessary to 
find responsibility in order to assign responsibilities for ending the suffering of the poor when 
we consider that half the world’s population has the capability to assist. Introducing 
communitarian moral beliefs to Singer’s cosmopolitan world view shows that there is a need 
for a stronger motivational heart in order to address the problem. This gap will be filled by 
Thomas Pogge who presents a cosmopolitanism removed from uncompromising philanthropic 
reasoning by giving evidence for the causal relationship between the poor and affluent, which 
due to today’s state of globalisation and a shared world economic system can be upheld 
neither theoretically nor practically. Resulting from this, most individuals, governments or 
international organisations feel obliged to redistribute part of their wealth in form of monetary 
donations and aid provisions. Redistributive justice, however, will be shown to be insufficient 
in addressing the cause for poverty as it focuses solely on its representation. In the final part it 
                                                          
11 O’Neil, O. Faces of Hunger: An essay on poverty, justice and development (London, Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 
xi.  
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will be suggested that the reason for this can be traced back to the way we recognise certain 
issues aligned to our historical development.  
 
Obligation and Responsibility 
 
Among international theories of justice the suffering of the poor seems to predominantly 
centre around the question of responsibility. Tracing responsibility for the suffering of whole 
countries was previously a straightforward exercise considering the state or community-
centric and bounded way humans have engaged with each other in the past. One of the best 
illustrations for this is our engagement in wars, in which it was nation states declaring war to 
other states and in its process harming each other’s population and causing suffering. 
Responsibility for today’s suffering in the face of global poverty however presents itself as a 
true challenge regarding the tracing back of responsibility; not least because of the different 
opinions concerning its origin. At least two main ways in which our interactions have changed 
notably can be identified; for one, we are at a point historically where we are able to cause 
harm to people without regard of state borders, arising from the fact that we are not purely 
associated with our home communities anymore and the people we interact with have become 
larger than your direct community; and further, our technological progress and development 
creates awareness of the severe suffering in other parts of the world. 
Important to mention here is that the term responsibility used above is not considered to 
contain any statement about the just or unjust nature of a war but mainly concerns the ability 
and necessity of investigating how the harm of people came about. However; it is the domain 
of normative theory, defined as ‘a body of work which addresses the moral dimension of 
international relations and the wider question of meaning and interpretation generated by the 
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discipline’ which enabled us to solve some of the moral dilemmas surrounding warfare and 
are believed to have enriched the debates on global injustices such as severe poverty.12 
The use of normative theory allows drawing on moral philosophers like Peter Singer who was 
among the first in his field to address the injustice of global poverty. As he says himself, 
‘philosophers have no special role to play in public affairs, since most public issues depend 
primarily on an assessment of facts’.13 However, his clearly provoking argument is of a 
particular kind, aimed at making people think critically, forcing them to question their 
behaviour and moral standards.  
Singer is of the opinion that global suffering and death are ‘not inevitable, not unavoidable in 
any fatalistic sense of the term’.14 Outlining the devastating circumstances of people in East 
Bengal in his famous article Famine, Affluence and Morality from 1972; Singer names a 
cyclone and civil war as reasons; however, he states that ‘nevertheless, it is not beyond the 
capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering’.15 
Believing that the decisions and actions of human beings can generally prevent this kind of 
suffering, he argues toward responsibilities unrelated to an external category such as that of 
another country in war. Other scholars have presented the matter in a similar light; for 
example Onora O’Neil who poses the question ‘if many are hungry and desperate what is 
there to do but provide food – at once?’16  
This kind of responsibilities that are based on the mere capability to help are commonly 
revered to as remedial responsibilities; ‘responsibilities we have to relieve harm and suffering 
                                                          
12 Brown, C. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (1992), p. chapter 1. 
13 Singer, P. in the documentary ‘Examined Life‘ by filmmaker Astra Taylor. Available from: 
http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/examined-life/ [Accessed 05 July 2012].  
14 Singer, Famine, p. 229. 
15 Singer, P. Famine, p. 229.  
16 O’Neil, Faces Hunger, p. 3.  
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when we are able to do so’.17 According to this, it seems to be the case that remedial 
responsibilities develop naturally with relative affluence.  
In his classic account of political obligation John Hurt states that ‘philosophers have tended to 
see one question as fundamental: on what basis, in terms of what reasons, should we 
legitimately ascribe political obligations to people?’18 This describes Singer accurately, who, 
despite saying that we only ought to morally prevent something bad from happening if we do 
not thereby sacrifice anything morally significant, clearly places moral obligation on those 
having the means to end it without taking other options into considerations.19 Singers claim is 
uncompromising, direct and leaves no doubt on who he believes should take responsibility for 
global poverty. Despite entailing a lot of power, it is often said not to be convincing enough 
for moral commitment.20  
Remarks that he would be treating poverty ‘as if it were a natural phenomenon like an 
earthquake’, make arguments like Singer’s seem superficial or as Andrew Kuper puts it, as 
presenting ‘royal road’ to the far more complex problem of global poverty.21 Even engaging 
in the counter-argument that he chooses simplified illustrations, like the pond analogy 
purposely, as it serves to demonstrate the apparently complex demands of global justice in 
terms of basic intuitions, cannot offset his neglect of motivational factors like distance and 
                                                          
17 Miller, National Responsibility, p. 231; Note: The ‘we’ used by Miller but also Singer and Pogge, refers to the 
affluent as he presumes that the reader lives just as the author himself in the developed and rich part of the 
World. 
18 Horton, J. Political Obligation (London, Macmillan, 1992), p. 4.  
19 Singer also offers a more moderate version of how much we ought to give, however, at the same time makes 
clear that the one presented above is closer to the truth. See: Singer, Famine, p. 241.  
20 Lichtenberg, J. ‘Absence of an unfond heart: why people are less giving than they might be‘ in The Ethics of 
Assistance – Morality and the Distant Needy, edited by Deen K. Chatterjee (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p.75.  
21 Miller, National Responsibility, p. 237 and Kuper, A. ‘Debate: Global Poverty Relief – More than Charity: 
Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”’, Ethics & International Affairs, 16, no.2 (2002) p. 108 – for a 
reply to Kuper also see: Singer, P., ‘Poverty, Facts, and Political Philosophies – Response to “More Than 
Charity”, Ethics and International Affairs, 16 (2002) p. 121. 
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emotional ties.22 These limits to the persuasiveness of Singer’s arguments will remain as long 
as its motivational heart is not subject to further investigation. To say it in Singer’s words 
published in a later article, ‘if it is supposed to be a mistake to have a map of moral 
obligations as flat as mine, then where, on a morally superior landscape, should the peaks, 
plateaus and escarpments be placed?’23 
 
Communitarian and Cosmopolitan Worldviews 
 
The consequences of historical factors such as a state-centric past and the related Christian 
heritage of the West becomes evident in how it has shaped our motivations and the way we 
conceive our moral obligations towards others. While, Singer believes that ‘a moral point of 
view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society’; other people object to this 
as they are of the opinion that our moral obligations are predominantly limited to the people 
in their immediate surroundings. 24  
This debate over whom we grant moral equal standing and thus feel obliged to assist can be 
illustrated in the two distinct world views of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. 
Communitarians are of the opinion that the moral agent or bearer of rights has first and 
foremost obligations towards his fellow citizens and direct community. This derives from the 
belief that the good life can only be exercised within the community as their visions are based 
on a shared enquiry that cannot be pursued or even known by solitary individuals. As such, 
they are opponent to the idea that ‘social unity can be sustained by such a weak bond as 
shared principles of justice’ but rather are inherent through a common culture, including 
                                                          
22 In which Singer asks the reader to consider a situation in which he walks past a shallow pond in which a child 
is drowning, to highlight that the passer-by has the moral duty to intervene and rescue the child even if it is at 
the cost of his clothes. See: Singer, Famine, p. 234.  
23 Singer, P. ’Outsiders: our obligations to those behind our borders‘ in The Ethics of Assistance – Morality and 
the Distant Needy, edited by Deen K. Chatterjee (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 12.  
24 Singer, Famine, p. 237.  
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shared language, which must be protected from decay.25 That communitarianism can 
nowadays often be understood as state-centric is only due to a fragile historic achievement, 
and should not be ‘abandoned in the naïve expectation that people’s natural sympathies are 
global in scope’.26 Ethical cosmopolitanisms on the contrary see themselves as ‘citizen of the 
world’ for which they extend their moral obligations to the global realm and claim that the 
interests of all persons should be given equal consideration.27 
According to the above definition, it becomes evident that Singer’s universalism does not rest 
upon an implausible account of motivation but rather on cosmopolitan claims based on a 
shared humanity. However, the notion that the moral obligations we have towards our own 
relatives, friends and countryman shall be globally extended to strangers in the distance, 
people we are unfamiliar with and living in foreign countries, still does not find universal 
acceptance. From this, the conclusion could be drawn that the difference lies in the modes of 
association, namely whether people regard themselves predominantly as part of either as 
humanity or community. Hence, it is an associational relationship, not causal one that leads to 
responsibilities in this case.  
Chris Brown claims that it was during the Enlightenment in the 18th Century that the term 
cosmopolitanism has been used widely and notions of morality were produced that rejected 
the old medieval view of given structures but demanded a focus on the individual as being 
equal.28 The most impressive statements of the time are represented in the works of Immanuel 
Kant during the Enlightenment period in Germany. According to him, ‘moral action is a 
                                                          
25 Kymlicka, W. Contemporary Political Philosophy – An Introduction (Oxford, Oxford university Press, 2002) 2nd 
ed., p. 271.  
26 Kymlicka, Political Philosophy, p. 270.  
27 Erskine, T. ‘Normative IR Theory’, in International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity, edited by 
Dunne, T.; Kurki, M.; Smith, S. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 42-44. 
28 Brown, C. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1992), Capters 1-3. 
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matter of choosing principles of action that reflect the demands of duty’.29 The ability to 
choose these principles of action arise from the fact that Kant sees the individual as a moral 
agent existing prior to society, able to distinguish between duty and own interest. What he 
calls the categorical imperative, a moral law that we have within us, make us subject to 
universal laws which we create all together. As such their worldview was hostile to 
communitarian thinkers which formed the Anti-Enlightenment. The German romantic 
philosopher Hegel denies that it is possible to think of individuals in isolation from the 
community which has shaped and constituted them through common culture, language and 
the like.  
However; despite this deeply rooted hostility, the demand to find a common ground for 
cosmopolitan and communitarian morality seems to constantly grow stronger. Toni Erskine 
speaks for many when she writes that an  
‘[...] important question for both moral philosophers and normative theorists of international 
relations is how we get from where we are currently standing, steeping in our own immediate 
circumstances, with our own particular ties and communities, to concern for those with whom 
we share neither kinship nor country, neighbourhood nor nation’30.  
To illustrate this, this paper will draw on David Miller. Being a renowned nationalist, the 
theoretical starting point of his work lies within the communitarian tradition that is to be 
addressed. Miller is of the opinion that communitarian responsibilities arise when people are 
linked together by ties arising from ‘shared activities and commitments, common identities, 
common histories, or other such source [...] this in particular imposes responsibilities toward 
any member of the relevant community who is harmed or in need’.31 Miller illustrates the 
                                                          
29 Kant, I. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge, Hackett Publishing, 1785) 3rd ed. Translated 
by James W. Ellington (1993), pp. 30.  
30 Erskine, T. ‘”Citizen of nowhere” or “the point where circles intersect”? Impartialist and embedded 
cosmopolitanisms’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28 (2002), p. 459.  
31 Miller, D. ‘Distributing Responsibilities‘, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (2001), p. 462. 
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above through an example of a group of hikers which go on a climbing trip in the mountains 
together and one of the members of the group gets injured. According to him, in this situation 
the responsibility for bringing aid to the injured rests collectively upon all members of the 
group. Although Miller might define the basis for communitarian responsibilities fairly 
loosely, adapting his definition and the presented example would result in an opening of the 
bounds of communitarian moral obligation. It cannot be argued that some poor and affluent 
countries have a common history as in the case of India and the British Empire. In cases 
where poor countries have been a former colony of an affluent country, claims for a 
responsibility to compensate for the harm arising from suppression are common.32  
Moreover, observing the global extend of our political and economic affairs, it can be argued 
that this can be understood as an engagement in shared activities. Based on this, we are all 
linked to each other and by forming a group of members also need to collectively take care of 
each other – inclusive of the global poor who are in need. And indeed, when considering our 
engagement in a shared world economic system, we all, to varying extents are participants in 
at least one major group outside of the shared humanity claimed by Singer. It can be 
suggested here that the groups Miller was concerned with are based on traditional forms of 
human involvement; however, modern forms of interaction can be of a much larger scale. In 
the light of today’s state of globalisation and interconnectedness of all countries it appears 
almost impossible to persist with strict communitarian claims and resist a general 
responsibility to assist.  
The word ‘strict’ here attempts to express that for the purpose of this paper it is important to 
understand the challenges of communitarianism in today’s state of globalisation and the 
necessity of cosmopolitan arguments towards the alleviation of global poverty. Whereas in the 
past it might have been acceptable to claim responsibility only toward the people within one’s 
                                                          
32 Miller, National Responsibility, pp. 250-252.  
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own community as they were the only ones one would engage with; today’s global 
interconnectivity does not leave this freedom anymore as we, through our way of life, through 
the products we buy and consume etc. engage with people all over the world and according to 
the above, thus have a responsibility towards them. However, this does not require an 
agreement or a reading in a highly egalitarian sense. Thus, concerning the two worldviews it 
appears that the actual discussion should not be about one presenting the true path to follow 
but the level to which one accepts certain claims. Hence, it would be possible to agree to 
claims for a general responsibility towards everyone on this planet based on a shared 
humanity, but would preserve the right for a special responsibility towards relatives and 
immediate surroundings. 
It is important here to emphasise that this change from identity based responsibility grounded 
on the question of whom one associates with and thus feels obliged to help, to causal 
responsibility arising from the fact that our modern way of interconnectivity demands a wider 
association, is a non-voluntary one but subject to the causality of global social factors such as 
our contemporary market system. Whether one’s responsibility is based on an association 
with humanity or community, one’s causal responsibility remains detached from that.  
 
Arguments for Causal Responsibility 
 
A scholar who is known as a major proponent of the above presented argument for extended 
moral obligations due to economic interconnectivity is Thomas Pogge. He refrains from 
dilated theoretical arguments for cosmopolitan engagement but starts by drawing on real 
world demands, taking global interconnectedness for granted. Thus, his cosmopolitanism 
appears one step further focusing solely on the responsibilities arising from the current state 
of affairs and not doubting to whom they are assigned to. 
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Despite both Singer and Pogge belonging under the umbrella of cosmopolitanism if seen as a 
label, Pogge’s cosmopolitanism derives from a different source from that of Singer. They both 
share the opinion that global poverty is intolerable and that there is something wrong with the 
moral norms and values of affluent people in first world states who fail to address the issue 
appropriately over extended theoretical debates. Furthermore, they both clearly state that 
modern technology informs our knowledge about the existing circumstances in which the 
poor find themselves to the extent that there remains no room for ignorance of the problem 
and its severity.  
However, despite the two placing the responsibility to end the suffering of the worlds poor on 
the affluent, their motivation to do so varies. While Singer bases responsibilities to assist on 
altruistic claims of a shared humanity due to which we are obliged to help purely because we 
have the capability; for Pogge these responsibilities originate from the belief that the affluent 
have brought about the suffering in the first place. According to him, responsibilities arise 
from the structural harm the affluent oppose on the poor due to the global economic system. 
Poverty in his view should be regarded as a violation of human rights and is something first 
world states greatly contributed to through ‘the policies [...] they pursue and the international 
order [they] impose’.33 He rigorously describes how rich countries no longer practise slavery, 
colonialism, or genocide but still enjoy crushing economic, political, and military dominance 
over the rest of the world.34  
The responsibilities raised by Pogge can be referred to as outcome responsibilities, defined as 
‘the responsibilities we have for the gains and losses resulting from our actions’.35 Pogge 
agrees with the remedial responsibilities presented by Singer, but believes that these arise 
from a deeper rooted causal responsibility. Thus the affluent do not only have the positive 
                                                          
33 Pogge, T. ‘Priorities of Global Justice‘, in Global Justice edited by Thomas Pogge (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 2001), p.22.  
34 Pogge, World Poverty, p. 6.  
35 Miller, D. National Responsibility, p. 231.  
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duty to assist the poor but a negative duty to not harm them. As such, Pogge is not opposed to 
a possible priority-for-compatriots without undermining a greater universal responsibility as 
discussed above. However, he sets clear limits to it when saying, ‘we may well have less 
reason to benefit foreigners than to confer equivalent benefits on our compatriots. But we 
have as much reason not to harm foreigners as we have to inflict equivalent harms on 
compatriots’.36 On the question of whether the affluent would have a positive duty in the 
absence of a negative duty Pogge remains neutral, it can be suggested that this is merely 
because his theory is based in the real world in its current state in which this scenario does not 
apply.  
Due to the different paths of reasoning through which Pogge and Singer arrive at a 
responsibility to take action against the suffering of the poor; Pogge manages to bypass the 
motivational vacuum that Singer is accused of. Singer was criticised for failing to present 
motivationally strong arguments for remedial responsibilities; as from a non-engagement in 
these responsibilities, we might let the poor die but there were no bad consequences attached 
to the affluent refusing to assist. The significant difference with Pogge’s argumentation lies in 
the fact that if we are causally responsible for the suffering of the poor then not taking action 
to prevent their starvation may be considered equal to actively killing them. As a result, Pogge 
manages to close the motivational vacuum by offering an entirely different account of where 
our responsibilities arise from. Moreover, he gives evidence for a causal relationship that we 
cannot resist in identifying with as well as ultimately turning ‘Good Samaritan’ relationships 
into relationships of justice. This occurs, however, at the expense disregarding important 
aspects of cosmopolitanism, if not its very foundation, namely the unconditional and 
unrelated nature on which claims for assistance for anyone in need find pursuance. In a sense, 
Pogge’s cosmopolitanism seems migrated from its origin, almost to the extent that his 
argument could persist without it.  
                                                          
36 Pogge, World Poverty, p. 12.  
R e c o g n i s i n g  R e c o g n i t i o n    | 21 
 
 
Pure Redistributive Justice 
 
In order to comply with the responsibilities the affluent owe to distant strangers it has become 
common practice to engage in forms redistribution, as the under-fulfilment of human rights as 
in the case of the poor is believed to be based predominantly on economic inequality, thus 
redistribution is most often carried out in monetary form through redistribution of wealth. 
Despite Pogge’s argument aims for a distributive justice that does not solely redistribute an 
already given pool of resources, thus improving on the given maldistribution, but one that 
allows the creation of new economic ground rules that ‘regulate property, cooperation, and 
exchange and thereby condition production and distribution’; on one view, he also defends 
redistribution in its standard form that aims for an economic order under which each 
participant would be able to meet her basic social and economic needs.37 Hence; 
redistribution contains various aspects within Pogge’s argument concerning world poverty 
and human rights; however, redistribution is mostly aimed at revising the institutional form.  
As such, he proofs Richard Rorty wrong for supporting the wide spread assumption and 
common reason against redistribution of wealth, that world poverty is too large a problem to 
be eradicated at a cost that would be bearable for the affluent countries. What Rorty presumes 
is that ending poverty of 2,800 million human beings would result in a negative impact on our 
own national development such as the capacity to provide social justice and decent live in our 
communities. However; Pogge reverses this by giving an account of the enormous extend of 
global inequality in wealth according to which it would take ‘just1.2 percent of the aggregate 
annual gross national incomes of the high-income economies’ to eradicate severe poverty 
worldwide.38 This is a case for whose sake we should spend the money gladly; especially 
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considering that in other cases such as natural catastrophes we give similar amounts to rebuild 
where there is nothing left without damage or notable difference to our own life 
circumstances.  
Regarding redistribution of wealth as the best means to end poverty; almost every Western 
state as well as corporations, charity organisations and individuals engage in monetary 
redistribution of wealth by donating parts of their GDP, profit or income.  
 
Despite this engagement, redistributive justice has not been shown to alleviate global poverty 
to any sufficient degree. Multiple reasons for this are given, such as infrequent engagement in 
monetary donations by individuals to charities, administrative problems within aid 
organisations or corruptness of government elites in third world countries. 
The idea of charity as a way to address our moral obligation and decrease the divide between 
the rich and the poor has long established roots. Thomas Aquinas who lived between 1225-
and 1274 already stated that ‘the bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the 
clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption 
and freedom of the penniless’.39 This bears similarities with the argument presented by Singer 
who believes that we should give away until we reach the level of marginal utility – meaning 
until giving away more would make ourselves suffer. But also other modern scholars agree 
that charity is a familiar remedy; Thomas Nagel regards it especially appropriate when 
inequality of wealth is paralleled with an inequality of power. According to him, ‘the worst 
effects of market inequalities should be dealt with by charity: charity of the rich nations 
toward the poor’ and further, the ‘only motive available for parting the wealthy from their 
                                                          
39 Aquinas, T. ‘Summa Theologica‘ quoted in Singer, P. ‘The Bread Which You Withhold Belongs To The Hungry’: 
Attitudes To Poverty. Available from: http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2002----03.htm [Accessed 20 July 
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possession seems to be generosity - or appeal to the duty of charity’. 40 Despite the fact that 
Nagel here speaks of the engagement of nations; charity in the form of monetary donations is 
usually understood as an act by the individual. As such, a reason for an insufficient 
engagement in this form of redistribution can also be traced back to a lack of individual 
involvement.  
Another form of wealth redistribution is of course the engagement in donations on a larger 
scale; either by charity or non-governmental organisations collecting the individual’s donation 
or through government spending. These forms are targeted mostly at development aid. While 
foreign donations of food are criticised for depressing demand in local markets, thus 
undermining the foundation of a independent economy in poor nations, monetary donations 
are believed to have the potential to enhance the income of the poor. However, this must be 
spent wisely as direct transfers to poor households bare the danger of creating dependency. A 
worthy investment for the eradication of poverty appears to be the targeting of money at 
programmes that provide ‘help for self-help’ such as basic schooling, school lunches, 
vaccinations, safe water, housing, rail, road and communication links and similar.41 Such 
projects played an important role in now developed countries like India and thus can be 
believed to work in others. 
But unfortunately good intentions do not always lead to success. In reality development 
assistance has done little for the development of poor countries – at least in relation to the 
money invested. Drawing on scandals about misspending or sums of money lost in 
administrative processes, one could suspect the source of insufficiency of delivering aid lies 
there. However, others are convinced that most aid is not aimed at promoting development 
but that it is, for example, politicians who ‘allocate it to benefit those who are able and willing 
                                                          
40 Nagel, T. ‘Poverty and food: why charity is not enough’ in Food Policy – The Responsibility of the United 
States in the Life and Death Choices edited by Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue (New York, The Free Press, 1977) 
p. 56.  
41 Pogge, World Poverty, pp. 8-9.  
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to reciprocate: export firms in the donor countries and political-economic elites of 
strategically important developing states’.42 Proof for this can be found in reports of aid 
allocations like the UNDP Report which shows that only 19 percent of all official 
development assistance is received by 43 percent of the least developed countries and only 8.3 
percent is targeted at to meet basic needs of the poor.43 
A very different reason for the insufficiency of redistributive justice is presented by Miller 
who is of the opinion that it is not only external factors, but rather internal factors like 
defective economical and political structures or the corrupt nature of a poor state that count a 
reasons for the ongoing suffering of the poor. Miller’s scepticism derives from facts presented 
in a case study in which two counties, Malaysia and Ghana faced equally bad conditions when 
gaining independence from Great Britain in 1957, while Malaysia’s average income today is 
ten times higher than in Ghana which suffers from dire poverty.44 As both of the countries 
were exposed to the same external factor, Miller draws the conclusion that national factors are 
primarily responsible for unequal development.  
This presents a point of view which aims to undermine the claims for a direct responsibility of 
affluent states due to structural factors or capability, thus presenting the danger of providing 
an excuse for non-engagement. Miller demands that correctives be placed upon current forms 
of responsibility allocations on the affluent states alone and thus tries to promote a dual-
responsibility rather than a non-engagement per se. According to him, human citizens should 
be responded to both ‘as agents capable of taking responsibility for the outcomes of their 
actions and as vulnerable and needy creatures who may not be able to lead decent lives 
without the help of others’ (emphasis in original).45 Miller’s demands for responsibility of 
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suffering third world countries would give the poor agency; something often neglected in 
redistributive theories of justice. Miller though is heavily opposed to the way Singer 
represents the poor as innocent children in his pond analogy, who came into the predicament 
they find themselves in without own contribution. Seen as having agency, at least the adult 
poor should take responsibility for their children; ‘bringing children into existence bears 
responsibility to provide primary care for them’.46  
To whatever extent redistributive justice might gain by Miller’s claims, his argument which 
‘traces back human misery to bad national policies and institutions in the poor countries’, 
labelled by Pogge as ‘explanatory nationalism’, cannot take account of significant 
international interdependencies as outlined above. Hence, third world counties are led into 
corruption, a path that persisted through most countries colonial influence as their 
bureaucratic processes were rarely revised after gaining independence and are often 
additionally aggravated through tight restrictions of the IMF and other international 
institutions. Overall, the persistence of world poverty despite attempts of wealth redistribution 
cannot fully be explained in national terms.  
Although it cannot and certainly will not be expressly doubted that the above factors can be 
regarded as participatory or additive factors; the above findings lead to the belief that there 
must be other reasons for the insufficiency of redistribution. This paper will even go as far as 
to claim that even in an ideal world – meaning a world in which all of the above would not 
occur and redistribution can be exercised as in its theoretical outline – redistribution would be 
insufficient. It is believed that current efforts for redistribution or even the attempt to establish 
a solid redistributive programme into policy have thus far failed or clearly not worked as 
efficiently helped as many people as they could and should have.  
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The reason for this is believed to be found in the fact that redistribution merely addresses the 
symptom or representation of the injustice of global poverty but not its actual cause. What is 
meant by this latter statement shall be illustrated with an example given by Reinhold Niebuhr 
in his book ‘Moral Man and Immoral Society’, in a different context from the original:  
‘The Negro schools, conducted under the auspices of white philanthropy, encourage 
individual Negroes to higher forms of self-realisation; but they do not make frontal attack 
upon the social injustices from which the Negro suffers’.47  
Here - as in the case of redistribution as this paper claims – the unequal treatment of black 
people who were refused education as they were regarded inferior to white people is claimed 
to be addressed through the building of ‘Negro schools’. However, the actual injustice of 
racial segregation, which fails to grant the black people the same recognition as the white 
people, thus resulting in different or better unequal treatment remains completely 
unaddressed. Today racial segregation has been largely ended within Western domestic law, 
and even though racial discrimination persists in some parts of the world, it can be said that 
black people are recognised as equals to the extent that calling them ‘Negros’ as Niebuhr did 
is regarded as politically highly incorrect. Niebuhr well notably wrote the above in 1932, 
which brings evidence that the recognition of a problem and thus whether we address its 
symptom or its actual cause can change over time.  
This can also be perceived by looking at other matters that are found to be an essential part of 
human life but have not been regarded in these terms in earlier societies. An example of this 
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would be that the access to internet is nowadays officially claimed to be a human right.48 As 
such they reflect the human development and adapt their standards to today’s world.  
From this, one could conclude that the reason for the insufficiency of redistribution lies in the 
fact that the real injustice done to the poor is not recognised accordingly, and thus all it seems 
to address in its current form is its representation in the face of suffering.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has argued that redistribution proves to be insufficient in addressing the matter of 
world poverty. It did this by first of all investigating the origins of redistributive justice which 
are believed to be located in the causal responsibility the affluent living in first world states 
have towards the poor, mainly due to a shared, but imposed, world economic system. Thus 
causal responsibility has been found to overpower claims for remedial responsibility based on 
the mere capability to produce relief as well as the commonly debated question of whom we 
associate ourselves with – humanity or community- and thus grant moral equal status and feel 
obliged to assist. This was presented through the particular world views of communitarianism 
and cosmopolitanism. Having further investigated a variety of factors having the potential to 
cause the insufficiency of redistribution, they were found to be contributing, but the real 
reason to be lying in the fact that redistribution only addresses the symptoms of the injustice 
of poverty but not its real cause. As such what makes redistribution insufficient is not, as 
commonly believed, a lack of motivational factors but rather structurally induced 
misrecognition that impacts upon the form of redistribution used to address world poverty. 
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SECTION TWO: THE ESSENTIALITY OF RECOGNITION 
 
 
‘The frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness’.49 
– Martin Heidegger 
 
Introduction 
 
Having shown that the insufficiency of redistributive justice as a relief to the enduring and 
long-know problem of global poverty cannot be traced back to an abdication of responsibility 
or a lack of motivation but to the fact that the form in which redistribution is exerted solely 
addresses the symptoms and not the actual cause of the injustice of severe poverty; the 
following section will highlight the essential role of recognition to overcome this 
insufficiency. The section will do this by first of all investigating on why redistributive justice 
proofs to be insufficient, to which the answer is believed to be found within the way the world 
economic system impacts on our social domain and thus through a change of our value 
structure causes the misrecognition of the poor. It will then proceed by showing that all 
redistribution is based on some form of recognition; however that the currently exerted form 
of redistribution, labelled as economic redistribution, only is subject to a cognitive recognition 
of the physical existence of the poor. For this to be right, the claim for a variety of different 
forms of recognition will be made on which basis investigations towards a more fruitful form 
of recognition to underlie redistribution will take place. It will then make use of Axel 
Honneth’s work on the different forms of recognition and which further proof misrecognition 
not only to have harming psychological effects but also not to comply with demands of 
justice. The crucial role of recognition will be further supported through drawing on Nancy 
                                                          
49 Martin Heidegger quoted in Dobsen, A. ‘Thick Cosmopolitanism’, Political Studies Association, 54 (2006), p. 
196.  
R e c o g n i s i n g  R e c o g n i t i o n    | 29 
 
Fraser who believes that a dual axis – a combination of the presumed opposing normative 
paradigms redistribution and recognition - is essential for justice. At last, the section will 
conclude by suggesting that basing redistribution on recognition in the form of equal status 
will result in what has been labelled as solidarity based redistribution and enables the 
empowerment of the poor which ultimately leads to a sufficient address of world poverty.  
The Concept of Recognition 
 
This section will start at the very point the past section has ended, namely the claim for 
structurally induced misrecognition which impacts on the form of redistribution used to 
address world poverty. As the notion of redistribution as well as its origin has found great 
attention thus far, it is especially the former, structurally enforced misrecognition, which will 
be focused upon in the following.  
As discussed above, the inescapable reason for our responsibility towards the poor lays in a 
shared world economic system which the affluent first world countries impose upon the poor. 
A system that according to Pogge does not allow the poor countries to flourish and participate 
on equal terms and thus can be regarded to cause structural harm. As there are no considerable 
alternatives to the current world economic system, this structural harm appears infinite, 
perpetuated through every human’s daily engagement. Thus far to structurally enforced harm 
which has been found responsible for ongoing global poverty, however, it needs to be brought 
into relation to the structurally enforced misrecognition of the poor which has been claimed to 
be responsible for the insufficient address of global poverty through redistribution. In this 
relationship, structurally enforced misrecognition can be regarded as a by product; subject to 
the underlying value structure of the world economic system. The capitalist order is regulated 
by demand and supply of the consumers, the people living on this planet. Within the capitalist 
market production and surplus-production are crucial as they are able to influence the balance 
between demand and supply. Within this very powerful interplay, the worker who produces 
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the products has become to be regarded as a means of production, a social construction which 
caused an objectification or ‘capitalisation’ of the workforce and labour power.50 As a result, 
it appears that the value or worth of humans within the system we operate is highly 
determined by economic terms, understood as monetary power. According to this, the 
misrecognition of the poor can be understood to result from the influence of Capitalism on the 
value structure we operate on and judge others by, and which ultimately influences our 
engagement in redistributive justice.  
 
Under the term ‘social nature of market exchange’ this is something often demonstrated by 
drawing on the work of Karl Marx.51 But also other scholars like the political philosopher 
Michael Sandel support claims that ‘there has been a shift from having a market economy to 
having a market society, where people are mainly motivated by money’.52 According to him 
this development cannot be seen as the natural progression of capitalism as it has reached an 
intensity over the past three decades that did not exist before. On the question of who should 
be to blame, Sandel claims all of us responsible for not having a public debate about which 
higher moral values should restrict the extension of the economic market, a debate necessary 
for democratic societies if we do not want the market to govern every sphere of life. So it 
seems like that what was once meant to trigger prosperity and freedom for all humans, does in 
reality impact on the morality on which we recognise others like the poor. What must be 
avoided though, is a simplistic portrayal in the sense that ‘if markets dominate too much, our 
morals go out of the window’ as the economic market as such can only be accused to be 
amoral not immoral.53 As Sandel outlines, it is the pluralistic societies within these markets, 
                                                          
50 Marx, K. Capital. Available through: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02b.htm#490 [Accessed 20 August 2012] p. 
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51 Marx, Capital, p. 490 [online]. 
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all following different understandings of morality, which cause this effect. However, relating 
back to Pogge, within theses pluralistic societies it is the first world states who dominate; 
‘dominant conceptions of justice are shaped by the dominant group’s shared interests, which 
in turn are shaped by its specific role in controlling the means of economic production’.54 
 
The reverse effect of the reification of persons, the personification of things, is addressed by 
the Czech philosopher Slavoj Zizek in what he calls ‘capitalism with a human face’.55 While 
capitalism, as outlined, has heavily impacted on the social domain, capitalism itself has also 
been impacted by a parallel movement which attempts to make capitalism work for socialism, 
to be understood in the sense of ‘let’s not discard the evil, let’s make the evil work for the 
good’.56 Although it has been stated that capitalism as such is not immoral or ‘evil’; what is 
meant by this, is that there have been attempts to modify capitalism to have a positive notion. 
Evidence and reinforcement of this notion of capitalism, and thus the value structure which 
causes misrecognition of the poor, can be found in modern consumerism. Consumerism 
which can traditionally be understood as the exertion of capitalism has always been regarded 
separately from any kind of social engagement.  
The apparent positive modification of pure capitalism to what Zizek calls ‘cultural capitalism’ 
around 1968 has been caused by a different consumerist engagement.57 While before the 
social and economic domain have been largely separated - one would earn and spend money 
and on top that give something back to society as a whole - today’s consumerism has the 
tendency to bring the two domains together in one and the same gesture. As such it became 
common to engage in an ethical action while consuming; as evident in the case of buying a 
product on the promise that a certain amount of the money spent goes towards poverty relief.  
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A negative outcome of this development is that it gives people the impression that they can 
buy to be ethical and thus do not need to be ethical (own emphasis). While buying a product, 
one at the same time fulfils a range of moral duties such a fighting global poverty or 
protecting the environment. Drawing on the above, this engagement can almost be seen as 
repairing with the right hand what has been ruined with the left. Within Zizek’s notion of 
cultural capitalism, however, this idea has been universalised so that most people are 
consuming in the strong belief to have done enough ‘good’ by buying certain products and 
thus will not question their actions –something one could describe as ‘blind consumerism’.  
This paper claims that it is this blind consumerism that causes the real problem to be rendered 
invisible and the poor to be misrecognised.  
 
Concluding from this, the affluent who find themselves faced by dire poverty and 
accordingly, however with misdirected intentions through the influence of capitalism, set 
themselves the task of remedying the suffering that they see. However these remedies as in 
the form of redistribution do not cure poverty, they merely prolong it or even contribute to it 
as they are only aiming at monetary equalisation. Through this limitation, the resulting form 
of redistribution can be described and labelled as ‘economic redistribution’. What is needed 
then to make redistribution sufficient is a form of redistribution that exceeds pure economic 
redistribution. This however, can only be achieved by first of all enabling the affluent to gain 
back the ability to see – something that is believed to be achievable through the notion of 
recognition. 
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Different forms of recognition 
 
In case the above presented claim is correct – which would certainly explain the 
misrecognition of the poor – how comes we engage in redistributive justice at all? If 
according to the above the recognition of a human being is determined by its economic or 
monetary power, would the resulting effect not be the one of total non-recognition instead of 
misrecognition? 
These are absolutely valid questions to which the answer can be detected above; the origin for 
the need to give capitalism a more positive notion brings evidence that there was obviously a 
point where it has been realised that a pure consumerist act without any ethical notions is bad. 
This finds support in Zizek’s belief that we do not eat organic food because it makes us feel 
better on a physical level – he claims that most people would not even be able to tell the 
difference – but as he says, that it makes them feel ‘warm’ and good about themselves. What 
he describes could be labelled as a cognitive wellbeing. 
Based on this, it can be said that we do recognise the poor despite their lack of economic and 
monetary power; however, only as far as that we cognitively recognise their physical 
existence. As such not exceeding the very basic form of recognition and certainly not 
comparable with a moral recognition of any sort. This purely cognitive recognition allows – 
again through the glasses of monetary power – to see their physical suffering; the very fact 
that they are economically badly off. The engagement in economic redistribution aims at 
relieving this very physical suffering and more importantly it is this kind of recognition all 
economic redistribution is based upon. The latter is a claim that finds confirmation in the very 
origin for redistribution, manly presented through Singer who based remedial responsibilities 
on the mere factor that we are fully aware and knowledgeable about the living circumstances 
of the poor. 
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However, if as it has been claimed, the poor are misrecognised in this way, it might be exactly 
these altruistic virtues which Singer presents, that prevent ‘true’ recognition of the poor. This 
further, goes in line with an illustration Zizek uses: 
‘the worst slave owners were those who were kind to their slaves and so prevented the core of 
the problem being realised by those who suffered from it and those who contemplated it’.58 
This would mean that Singer’s claim could possibly end up as counterproductive to the aim it 
is meant to fulfil. Attempting to overcome the significant discrepancies in wealth between the 
affluent and the poor by giving away ‘until we ourselves reach the level of marginal utility’ 
conceal the required form of recognition that goes beyond economic redistribution 
 
Apart from this, a completely different matter becomes evident namely the fact that there 
must be different forms of recognition existent within human interaction. For example a form 
of moral recognition that exceeds the basic form of pure cognitive recognition. In this case, 
there would be a possibility to exchange the form of recognition on which economic 
redistribution is currently based upon in order to make it more sufficient and appropriate in its 
address of global poverty.  
 
The idea that recognition can have different forms was famously re-established by social 
philosopher Axel Honneth in his book ‘The Struggles of Recognition’, first published in 
German in 1992. By drawing on the work of David Mead and the young Hegel in his Jena 
manuscripts, he identified three patterns of intersubjective recognition: Love, Rights and 
Solidarity. His findings which are both highly original but at the same time firmly rooted in 
the history of modern social theory, were found quite controversial as they made clear that the 
demands of justice cannot simply be fulfilled through a fair distribution of material goods as 
long as some member of the society are systematically denied the recognition they deserve.  
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According to Honneth, the continued misrecognition, as a purely cognitive recognition, can 
have a harming impact on the poor as well as on the affluent. The misrecognition or non-
recognition as status equals can take the form of denigration or insult of the poor.59 This 
together with the ongoing starvation due to a lack of nutrition while the affluent accumulate 
their possessions are by some believed to result in protest and uprising, as Honneth himself 
states the endurance of ‘under-privileging necessarily leads to a crippling feeling of social 
shame, from which one can be liberated only through active protest and resistance’.60 
Moreover; forms of recognition are always to be understood as reciprocal – for which one 
should recognise others as one wishes to be recognised. As such the affluent are subject to the 
harm of misrecognition as well which finds representation through a lack of self-esteem in the 
practical relation to self and threatens a human’s honour and dignity. 
These described harming effects from misrecognition, which when reversed and the 
appropriate recognition granted can in this context be said to have a healing effect, appear to 
predominantly focus on the psychological harm that occurs.61 However, there is more to that. 
As the recalling of Pogge will show, misrecognition stands in direct relation to the violation 
of human rights and as the latter is regarded as injust so can misrecognition itself be regarded 
as not to comply with justice. This ultimately makes recognition a vital component of justice. 
The above will be illustrated through the outline of Honneth’s three forms of intersubjective 
recognition.  
 
Love, the first pattern for recognition within Honneth’s taxonomy is referring to primary 
relationships that are constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of 
people. As such it is defined in a fairly neutral sense and includes models of friendship or 
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parent-child relations as well as erotic relationships between lovers.62 Although this form of 
recognition is neither the one currently upheld by the affluent within redistributive justice, nor 
believed to be the one suitable for sufficient address of poverty; love based recognition holds 
a crucial role as it is traditionally the first form of recognition that human beings experience 
and thus determining for all other forms of recognition. When a child is born, it does not have 
the ability to recognise itself as an individual but perceives itself a well as its needs as part of 
nature. Evidence for this has been presented through the fact that young children – just like 
some animal species - do not possess the ability to see themselves in a mirror. The first time 
the child perceives a significant ‘other’ is in the role of the mother; as she is the one who 
fulfils the primary needs of the child in its state of helplessness the child’s survival is 
dependent on her. It is this phase of early childhood, to which most pathological disorders can 
be traced back; so is the threatened loss of the mother during this phase is believed to be the 
cause of all mature varieties of anxiety. Moreover, it is through the precedent of the 
unconditional love of the mother; that the child develops its individual active willingness to 
produce interpersonal proximity upon which all forms of affectionate bonds are based.63 This 
ability to reciprocate bonds like that of love is the very factor on which all forms of 
recognition depend. Although the other forms that will be presented are subject to different 
patterns of mutual recognition; it is in this phase of life during which the very ability for 
reciprocal recognition is gained.  
However, in contrast to the other forms of recognition, love relationships which presupposes 
liking and attraction always contain an element of moral particularism, as they are out of the 
individual’s control thus cannot be extended at will ‘beyond the social circle of primary 
relationships, to cover a large number of partners for interaction’.64 
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The second pattern for recognition presented by Honneth, rights, differs in essential aspects as 
the granting of legal rights is determined by the individual and does not underlie the same 
moral particularism but can be extended according to rational choice. However, this pattern of 
recognition is still dependent on the socialisation process outlined above which builds the 
basis for reciprocal recognition as ‘we can only come to understand ourselves as bearer of 
rights when we know, in turn, what various normative obligations we must keep vis-à- vis 
others’.65 According to this, legal relations as a form of mutual recognition, is described in the 
way that ‘he behaves [...] toward others in a manner that is universally valid, recognizing 
them – as he wishes others to recognize him – as free, as persons’.66 Different to the case of 
love, the reciprocity for legal recognition emerges through the course of historical 
development; so is legal recognition accordingly to Mead in the first place only valid among 
people who are socially recognised as members of a set community. However, within Hegel’s 
definition, legal recognition becomes only legitimate when it entails a universalistic 
conception of morality. As Honneth says, ‘with the transition to modernity, the post-
conventional principles that had already been developed in philosophy and political theory 
made their way into established law’.67 This above shown influence of modernity on our 
notion of morality seems strongly familiar and goes in line with the communitarian – 
cosmopolitan debate presented in the first section of this paper.  
 
However, this form of legal recognition due to which we should grant each other universal 
respect beyond communal barriers becomes decoupled from social esteem in its practical 
adaptation. This decoupling can be understood in the way that legal recognition expresses the 
respect for the freedom of the will of other persons, while social esteem expresses the respect 
the individual receives according to the value society considers him to have. Honneth explains 
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these different forms of respect on the basis that ‘we can recognise human beings as persons 
without having to esteem their achievements to their character’.68 As according to him, the 
form of universalised respect always contains a Zurkenntnisnahme; being ‘cognizant of 
someone, which is semantically present in the word‘ recognition, however it is only when a 
situation is interpreted with practical knowledge that one moves from cognitive 
acknowledgement to what, since Kant, can be signified by a concept of moral respect.69 It is 
this latter form of recognition through moral respect that leads to Honneth third and highest 
form of recognition, solidarity.  
 
Solidarity, understood as mutual esteem –granting recognition, allows people to be respected 
in their personal difference and thus leads to symmetric relationships which compromise the 
cultural self-understanding of society and ultimately enables to view ‘one another in the light 
of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared 
praxis’.70 The underlying notion of this is that everyone should not only be regarded as free 
like in the generalization of legal rights but further recognised individually and thus leading to 
equalization in status. Within this transition from the recognition of legal rights to recognition 
based on solidarity, according to Honneth most struggles for recognition arise.71 The reason 
for this can believed to be found in the fact that such a transition would not only be enabling 
for the one recognised but also limiting for the one who grants recognition. In this sense, it 
demands true equality as one part can only be free if the other grants the appropriate room for 
this freedom.  
 
And indeed, what has been claimed in this paper earlier goes in line with the above outlined 
three forms of recognition of Honneth. It appears to that it is this struggle of recognition that 
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would need to be fought in order for the affluent to recognise the poor appropriately. The 
form of recognition that has been described in this paper as ‘cognitive recognition of the 
physical existence’ of the poor, can be regarded similar to Honneth’s legal recognition which 
are equally based on ‘cognitive acknowledgement’. Whether labelling it one or the other, in 
their essence they are trying to express one and the same form of recognition; a form of 
recognition that would grant a person generalised rights but nothing further. In the case of this 
paper this form of cognitive recognition has been described as misrecognition of the poor as it 
did not lead to a moral recognition; conceptualised in Honneth’s highest form of recognition 
based on solidarity and leading to equal status and social esteem.  
Recalling Pogge’s words that poverty should be regarded as a violation of human rights, 
emphasises this; he states clearly that human rights shall not be understood as in conceptual 
connection to legal rights because a realisation of human rights through legal rights would not 
be able to recognise every culture equally.72 Pogge’s demand for a conceptualisation of 
human rights that go beyond legal rights can be understood to be fulfilled in Honneth’s notion 
of solidarity.  
 
As it is the violation of human rights through outcome responsibility that leads to poverty, 
upon which Pogge bases redistributive and transformational demands; it can be believed that 
it will be the very form of solidarity based recognition which allows for human rights to be 
fulfilled that can enable pure economic redistribution to be exceeded and thus creates a form 
of redistribution that is sufficient in the relief of poverty. Basically, it is believed that the form 
of recognition affects the form of redistribution; hence, the form of economic redistribution 
derives from its underlying form of cognitive recognition and thus is the cause for the 
insufficiency in addressing global poverty. Recognition based on solidarity that grants moral 
equal status on the other hand, is believed to alter the form of redistribution. Through this 
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alternation the resulting form of redistribution would empower the poor to become 
independent agents by regarding them as equals. 
A natural consequence from this would be the appreciation of different values from which 
social esteem can arise which would demand a value structure that stands unaffected from 
pure economic performance as well as a societal structure that enables others and limits itself 
by giving the necessary freedom for others to develop as equals.  
 
Recognition as Essential to Justice 
 
Having demonstrated that misrecognition, as not recognising others according to Honneth’s 
highest form of recognition based on solidarity is unjust due to the harming psychological 
effects it can have but primarily because it does not fulfil the human rights as set out by 
Pogge; the paper will continue by highlighting the essentiality of recognition to justice.  
 
Although the impression might arose in the above claim that all redistributive theory is based 
on some form of recognition; to conclude from this that recognition is a mere epiphenomenon 
of redistribution is wrong. As will be seen, recognition has its very own relation to justice. 
Being almost regarded as a ‘keyword of our time’; recognition has recently attracted a lot of 
interest and is commonly used to describe contemporary conflicts; most of which arise from 
the challenges of multiculturalism supported through globalisation.73 Within political 
philosophy; the term recognition is used to unpack the normative basis of political claims 
whether the issue is ‘indigenous land claims or women’s carework, homosexual marriage or 
Muslim headscarves.’74 It thus appears that Hegel’s struggle for recognition, as Nancy Fraser 
nicely summarises, ‘finds new purchase as a rapidly globalizing capitalism accelerates 
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transcultural contacts, fracturing interpretative schemata, pluralizing value horizons, and 
politicising identities and differences’.75 
 
In the light of our modern society, Recognition appears as a progressive means to address 
social injustice. Its aim being the creation of a difference friendly world, it is often referred to 
as politics of difference or politics of identity. As such it has already been described in the 
outline of Honneth’s first form of recognition, love, during which a child learns to reciprocate 
and learns to differentiate itself from others and thus is an essential component of the identity 
formation process. Although, Honneth’s other forms of recognition lead straight on to the 
ideal form of recognition based on solidarity which grants equal status and thus would support 
claims for equal redistribution; critics regard the way Honneth arrives at this point as too all-
encompassing and thus opponent to him regard recognition as an anti-thesis to redistribution. 
Evidence for Honneth’s encompassment can be found in the integration of Kantian notions in 
his theory of recognition despite the fact that recognition is traditionally identified as deriving 
from a purely Hegelian notion.76 
 
As a result, struggles for redistribution are conventionally disassociated from struggles for 
recognition; while the one thrives towards an egalitarian order where resources and goods are 
distributed equally, the other thrives towards cultural diversity and promotes the value of 
difference.77 As egalitarianism and diversity in most contexts work against each other, the 
reason for the regard of them as an anti-thesis becomes evident. The most drastic distinction 
between the two terms are to be found in claims that redistribution is a matter of justice while 
recognition rather belongs to the realm of ethics; redistribution often understood as a matter of 
fairness and equal moral consideration, seeks to eliminate disparities between social actors 
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and as such is traditionally located in the domain of justice. Recognition on the other hand 
emphasises the ‘qualitative conditions needed for human flourishing [...] rather than fidelity to 
abstract requirements of equal treatment’ and thus seems at first sight to fall under the domain 
of ethics.78 Accordingly the decoupling of the two would go as far as to say that redistribution 
belonging to justice focuses on ‘the right’ whereas recognition belonging to ethics focuses on 
‘the good’. 
 
If the above separation is right, then anyone who would claim that both redistribution and 
recognition can be combined under the umbrella of justice – like it has been the case in this 
paper so far – is believed to run the risk of philosophical schizophrenia.79 Contra this wisdom, 
both Honneth and Fraser are of the strong belief that in order to solve the problems of today’s 
world both redistribution and recognition are needed. To illustrate that neither one can be 
overlooked in the present constellation they draw on 9/11 which made painfully clear that 
struggles over religion or nationality are imbricated to an extend that makes recognition 
impossible to ignore and at the same time economic inequalities are growing as neoliberal 
forces promote corporate globalization which makes redistribution impossible to ignore.80 
 
Both are of the opinion that the relation of the two remained mostly under-theorised as 
partisans of each term frantically upheld their positions. However; although Honneth agrees 
that they must be seen in relation, he regards recognition as fundamental and redistribution as 
derivative to it. The belief in a hierarchical order among the two clearly does not go in line 
with earlier claims made in this paper as equal material distribution does not automatically 
follow from the granting of universalised legal recognition. Drawing on the colonial period 
for example, shows that despite the independence of a country and the resulting legal 
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recognition as status equals did not bring with it an equalisation of economic power and 
resources. Without illustrating this further, it can be said that it is impossible to reduce 
redistribution in its essence to recognition or –as earlier discussed – recognition to 
redistribution.  
 
This claim is supported by Fraser whose theoretical communalities and agreement with 
Honneth part at this very point. Being of the opinion that recognition and redistribution are 
co-fundamental and thus mutually irreducible, she promotes what she calls the ‘dual-axis of 
justice’.81 In order to arrive at this notion of justice towards which both recognition and 
redistribution contribute on their own terms as two sui generis normative paradigms, however, 
are not regarded as conceptually incompatible; Fraser offers a redefinition of recognition. 
According to her, the aim of a recognition as politics of difference and identity in its essence 
demands nothing else as the universal accreditation of distinctiveness, thus it aims towards 
recognition of distinctive values as equal in status with others. Defining recognition as status 
equality turns around the presumed incompatibility with redistribution as claims for status 
equality and class equality do not corrupt each other but can work together. 
 
The redefined recognition allows granting the necessary subjective freedom and thus unlike 
Honneth’s reduction ad absurdum that morally entitles everyone to social esteem, it regards 
everyone as having ‘an equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal 
opportunity’.82 This way, egalitarian claims for liberty of everyone can be upheld and within 
it everyone can still determine what the good life is for him. Moreover, it makes recognition a 
matter of justice and not purely one of ethics; if recognition is seen as status equality then 
misrecognition would be seen a status subordination which ‘denies some individuals and 
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groups the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction’.83 This 
ultimately locates the injustice of misrecognition in social relations and not in psychologically 
harming effects – a point already made earlier but which only derived through the integration 
of Pogge’s conception of human rights and whose validity is now supported further. The 
location of the injustice in social relations over psychological effects further allows regarding 
the misrecognition as a ‘matter of externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments’ 
such as the one of the capitalist society and the world economic system as outlined in this 
paper.84 
 
From this it can be concluded, that defining recognition as status equality instead of politics of 
difference and identity in the first place eradicates all claims for the incompatibility of 
recognition and redistribution under the umbrella of justice. Furthermore, bringing evidence 
for a possible influence of our world economic system on forms of recognition supports the 
overall claim of this paper that the form of recognition, cognitive recognition, entailed in 
contemporary economic redistribution results in an insufficient address of world poverty. 
Thus, an approach that redresses the misrecognition that derives from the economic structure 
of society, is at the same time able to redress maldistribution and on top of that would enable 
to reduce inequality without creating ‘stigmatized classes of vulnerable people perceived as 
beneficiaries of special largesse’ of the affluent.85 
 
Conclusion 
 
All in all, this section has shown that it is the externally caused impediments through the 
world economic system which are additionally prolonged through everyone’s daily 
consumerist engagement, that cause the affluent to only cognitively recognise the poor and 
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thus has the effect of denying groups the possibility of being on par with others in social 
interaction since within this context the poor are treated as objects, and not a moral agents. 
Hence, they only are regarded as passive objects in redistribution policies that aim at a pure 
economic redistribution. Using equal status recognition in contrast, allows the poor to be 
recognised as moral equal subjects with equal status in social interaction. As a result, poverty 
policies in the notion of solidarity based redistribution have to recognise agency and focus on 
the empowerment of the poor. Moreover, it would result in the design aid programmes with 
their active input and that are adapted to their expressed differences and particularities. 
This moves the focus away from pure economic redistribution to context specific 
redistribution based on solidarity which itself leads to sufficient policies for the reduction of 
global poverty.  
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SECTION 3: THE CASE OF FAIR TRADE 
 
 
‘Justice is not an externally imposed requirement – it binds only insofar as its addresses can 
also rightly regard themselves as its authors’.86 
– Nancy Fraser 
 
Introduction 
 
This section aims at illustrating on the practical example of Fairtrade what has been 
theoretically established in the previous two sections. Through outlining the concept of 
Fairtrade it will be attempted to show that Fairtrade is intended to be used to decrease the 
growing gap in wealth and resources between the affluent and poor and thus is to be regarded 
as a form of redistributive justice. However, based on an illustration of the resulting different 
outcomes for the Fairtrade producers in poor countries, the consumers and the Fairtrade 
organisation as well as their partners; it will be claimed that Fairtrade does in fact is subject to 
purely economic redistribution and as such will be held insufficient in the address of global 
poverty. The reasons of Fairtrade to promote a redistributive concept that benefits the 
different parties in unequal terms will be shown not to derive from deceitful motives or to be 
based on some conspiracy as some might think but derive through the impact of the world 
economic system. Impacting on the value structure of the affluent to the extent that the value 
of something will be determined solely by economic power, the capitalist world economic 
system will be claimed the cause for the poor to only be cognitively recognised as suffering 
from a lack of economic power. It will further be shown how capitalism effectively manages 
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to commodify the suffering of the poor within the Fairtrade concept to a product that can be 
sold on the market. Through the theoretical shift of exchanging the form of cognitive 
recognition that underlies economic redistribution, to equal status recognition, the ideal form 
of solidarity based redistribution will be achieved and hence allows for structural change that 
enables the affluent to see the poor as equal partners with individual agency and thus able to 
deliver subjective assistance. This shall be shown to foster a dialogue in which the affluent 
and poor participate on an equal par to discuss the forms Fairtrade should take in order to 
create equal outcomes for every party involved and moreover to be sufficient in the 
alleviation of global poverty.  
 
The Concept of Fairtrade 
 
The Fairtrade model is aimed at the alleviation of poverty through the redistribution of wealth 
and resources among the affluent and the poor. Aiming to be a strategy for ‘the creation of 
opportunities for producers and workers who have been economically disadvantaged or 
marginalized by the conventional trading system’; they promote goods produced in third 
world countries to consumers in the first world at a higher selling price under the promise that 
the goods were produced under fair working conditions and that the producers in poor 
countries will be given a fair share of the selling price.87 In order for the consumer to 
recognise the Fairtrade goods, they will be labelled with the Fairtrade Mark. For a product to 
display the Fairtrade Mark it must meet the international standards which are set by the 
Fairtrade’s very own international certification body FLO (Fairtrade Labelling Organisation). 
The vision of Fairtrade as they state themselves, is one of ‘a world in which justice and 
sustainable development are at the heart of trade structures as that everyone, through their 
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work, can maintain a decent and dignified livelihood and develop their full potential’.88 To 
achieve this, they a number of key objectives such as a minimum price guarantee, an 
additional Fairtrade premium, pre-financing schemes as well as they set standards on the 
conditions for the production and trade of a product.89 
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Mal-exercised redistribution 
 
The Fairtrade model as outlined above can clearly be said be a practical example for 
redistributive theory as it fosters the equal distribution of wealth from the affluent which pay a 
higher price for products produced under fair conditions to the poor which receive a fair price 
for their work. However, although the model is thought to be decreasing the gap between the 
affluent and the poor and thus create equality it is in fact criticised to result in different 
outcomes for the producers in poor countries, the consumers of Fairtrade products and the 
Fairtrade organisation as well as it business partners who sell the product in the first world. 
This is supported by economist Dr Peter Griffiths who in a talk given to the European Coffee 
Symposium states that ‘Fairtrade is fantastic; it is fantastic at making rich Europeans think 
that they are good. It is fantastic at making money for European companies. Is it fantastic for 
the farmers in the third world?’ which he then clearly denies by ruling out a couple of 
negative effects of the Fairtrade model.90 According to him, the main issues with Fairtrade 
can be located in the fact that they hold no record of how much money goes to the farmer, 
they do not set any limits on how much extra can be charged for Fairtrade products when sold 
in the first world and most importantly they do not present any criteria for the countries that 
join the Fairtrade model. This results in the following; the consumer pays average of 15 per 
cent extra for ie an Fairtrade coffee in the belief that this would be the amount passed on to 
the producer; thus the psychological wellbeing if the consumer increases due to the believe 
that he has engaged in an apparent ethical act and moreover fulfilled his duty to ‘give back’ 
sufficiently.91 The Fairtrade Organisation as well as the in the selling process involved 
business partners has the perfect opportunity to increase its earnings, as from the lack of 
standards on selling price and farmers pay – for which the latter is only restricted by a 
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promised minimum pay to the producer that ‘at least covers the costs of sustainable 
production’, however, does not demand a passing on of a maximum surplus the seller might 
have made.92 Additionally, bureaucracy costs can be claimed to be too expensive to pass on a 
countable amount to the producer. The producer in the third world country find himself to be 
the very least beneficiary as despite receiving a promised minimum pay this does not exceed 
the costs of sustainable production for which he will not be able to gain independence. 
Moreover, the guarantee of the minimum price also entails a trading outside the world 
economic market which is not necessarily in the interest of the producer as it would attribute 
him a special status that would impact his ability to be regarded as equal within trade relations 
and further decrease independence. The praised Fairtrade premium reward that admittedly 
might benefit the direct community of the Fairtrade farmer at the same time result in unequal 
standards compared with the wider community and causes greater disparities and suffering for 
farmers not participating in the Fairtrade model. Just to mention one more, the objective of the 
Fairtrade organisation to enable pre-financing of the producers if needed, will create liabilities 
and thus adds to the dependence on Fairtrade.  
From this one can undoubtedly conclude that Fairtrade as a form of redistributive justice fails 
to fulfil its supposed aim to alleviate global poverty. This can further be supported through the 
fact mentioned by Griffiths that Fairtrade mainly operates in ‘rich countries’ countries like 
Mexico and Costa Rica.93 Griffith uses ‘rich’ here to disrobe the Fairtrade countries as they 
have 70 times the GDP of a country like Sierra Leone and thus measured by African standards 
is ‘well off’.  
However, the reason of Fairtrade to promote a redistributive model that benefits the different 
parties in unequal ways is not believed to derive from deceitful motives or to be based on 
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some higher conspiracy but to derive from the belief in redistributive justice which however 
misdirected honest intentions through the impact of the world economic system. The above 
outlined insufficiency of the redistributive attempts of Fairtrade is a perfect illustration of 
what in this paper has been labelled economic redistribution, a redistribution which only aims 
at monetary redistribution and not a structural alternation in any way. Evidence for this can 
claim to find in the fact that Fairtrade does not change the producer- supplier relation which 
massively impact on the resulting differences between the parties. Quite opponent to this, the 
current form of economic redistribution is confirmed and prolonged through the consumer’s 
engagement in Fairtrade. According to Zizek, the consumers who upheld predominant 
conceptions of Fairtrade and thus economic redistribution cannot be blamed for their naive 
actions as they are part of a system that does not allow them to question their actions and thus 
are ‘blind’ to see the real injustice of poverty.94 Within the capitalist system the suffering of 
the poor has been turned into Fairtrade goods that can be sold and bought on the market. 
Through this imbrication the consumer does not need to actively engage in ethical actions 
anymore but can simply buy to be ethical. Due to this, by buying a Fairtrade coffee, he is 
made believe to ‘buy into something bigger, buy into a coffee ethics’.95 
In fact, this is merely the result of the dominance of the world economic system which 
impacts on our value structure through which the value of a person is judged on economic 
terms, and is further aggravated through models like Fairtrade that foster a purely economic 
redistribution. As a consequence; within the Fairtrade model, the poor are only cognitively 
acknowledged in their suffering due to their lack of economic power. Evidence for this can be 
found in a statement on their official website which reads that ‘it is recognised that the degree 
of progress depends on the level of economic benefits [the poor] receive form Fairtrade’; what 
was meant to highlight the importance of the Fairtrade model does indeed show the lack of 
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reflection on the question of whether this form of redistribution should be altered as it clearly 
does not increase the ability of the poor to maintain the standard of progress and thus will 
always make the poor depend on the affluent’s ‘generous’ engagement.96  
From this it can be concluded that economic redistribution which is based on a form of 
cognitive recognition of the poor’s suffering from material needs only results in an 
dependence of the poor but does not address the cause of their poverty as for this a form of 
subjective help would need to be provided that includes the poor as equal partners in the 
solution process and thus would make their degree of progress not be entirely dependent on 
the level of economic benefits granted by the Fairtrade organisation.  
 
Introducing equal status recognition 
 
This structural change like this is believed to be achieved through a theoretical change of the 
form of recognition from a mere cognitive one to one of equal moral status. The result of an 
underlying form of equal status recognition would be a redistribution based on solidarity. 
While remaining within the Fairtrade model, the minimal consequences should be the 
empowerment of the poor by regarding them as moral equals with having their own agency in 
social interaction. As recognition is exercised on the principle of reciprocity, the 
empowerment of the poor would entail the formation of unions that allows them to 
collectively thrive for economic development and better working conditions as well as it 
would increase their selling and buying power. Through this, the work of the Fairtrade 
farmers will be regarded a prestigious as the one of the workers in the developed world. As 
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Martin Luther King Jr. said, ‘by the time we finish eating breakfast we have relied on half of 
the world’, towards which they would be seen to make a noteworthy contribution.97  
 
In order for this development to equals in status to take place, the Fairtrade organisation and 
business partners would though need to grant the necessary space; however, through the 
ability of the poor to actively determine the form Fairtrade policies take on, entailing their 
expressed visions of the good life, Fairtrade would gain a real partner to support the fulfilment 
of the vision of ‘a world in which justice and sustainable development are at the heart of trade 
structures as that everyone, through their work, can maintain a decent and dignified livelihood 
and develop their full potential’.98 The consumers would be able to engage in the Fairtrade 
process not as blind consumers but as aware of their obligations to alleviate global poverty, as 
well as outside the Fairtrade system.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This section has illustrated on the practical example of Fairtrade how a purely economic 
redistribution that is based on a mere cognitive recognition of the poor is insufficient in the 
address of global poverty as it purely benefits the ones already affluent. Through a theoretical 
shift of the form of recognition as granting equal status it was possible to show which 
structural change this would bring about. The resulting notion of redistribution based on 
solidarity would benefit all parties involved in the Fairtrade process and moreover entail the 
possibility of alleviating the suffering of the poor through a sufficient address of the cause for 
                                                          
97 King, M. L. Jr. quoted in DeCarlo, J. Fair Trade and How it Works (New York, The Rosen Publishing Group, 
2011), p. 13.  
98 Fairtrade Vision [online].  
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global poverty – hence justice for the poor could be achieved through an 
imbrications/combination of the two normative paradigms of redistribution and recognition.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper began by asking the question: Can the underlying assumptions of redistributive 
forms of justice be addressed through a dialogue with theories of recognition? It started with 
a numerical exposition of poverty to illustrate the severity of the suffering of half the 
world’s population. However, numerical expositions of this kind were said to lead more to 
the confusion and an overwhelming of the reader than to an active engagement against this 
state of nature due to the scope of the problem. Indeed, there are clear limits to the 
measurement of the human condition, as debates on global poverty actually are about the 
quality of life. Due to this, the argument in this paper has been based on the assumption that 
‘suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad’ which leads to a 
controversial debate on what this state of affair implies for the rest of us living on earth. 99  
Within international theories of justice the suffering of the poor seems to be centred on the 
question of responsibility. Tracing back the origins of responsibilities in the case of global 
poverty however, can present a real challenge following the increasing blurriness of borders 
due to globalisation. Through introducing Peter Singer, it was asked whether it is necessary to 
find responsibility in order to assign responsibilities for ending the suffering of the poor when 
we consider that half the world’s population has the capability to assist.100 Despite his 
argument it has been shown that there is need for a stronger motivational heart to confirm to 
obligations to address global poverty, especially regarding communitarians who traditionally 
only assign responsibility to people in their immediate surrounding and community.101 By 
illustrating that responsibilities limited solely to small communities cannot sustain this form 
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due to the state of globalisation and interconnectivity, the paper then drew on Thomas Pogge 
who presents a cosmopolitanism removed from an philanthropic reasoning and remedial 
responsibility by giving evidence for the causal relationship between the poor and affluent.102 
Resulting from this, most individuals, governments or international organisations feel obliged 
to redistribute part of their wealth in form of monetary donations and aid provisions. 
Redistributive justice, however, is claimed to be insufficient in addressing the cause of 
poverty as it focuses solely on its representation. From this it has been concluded that what 
makes redistribution insufficient is not, a lack of motivational factors but rather structurally 
induced misrecognition that impacts upon the form of redistribution used to address world 
poverty. 
Structurally induced misrecognition has been shown to derive from the influence of the world 
economic system on the value structure, causing the affluent to determine the worth of 
wellbeing based on economic power. By drawing on Michael Sandel and Slavoj Zizek it 
became evident that the dominance of capitalism has caused a reification of persons – which 
resulted in a shift from having a market economy to being a market society, which resulted in 
an understanding of ‘capitalism with a human face’ in the notion of cultural capitalism.103 
Evidence of this was shown to be found in modern consumerism, which brings the two 
domains of social and economic engagement together. As this imbrication becomes 
universalised and perpetuated, the affluent become ‘blind’ to what their intentions are and 
thus the misrecognition of the poor persists unaltered. 
It was then claimed that contemporary redistribution, labelled economic redistribution, merely 
underlies a cognitive recognition of the physical existence of the poor, and has the effect of 
denying groups the possibility of being on par with others in social interaction since within 
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this context the poor are treated as objects and not moral agents. Hence, they are regarded as 
passive objects in redistribution policies that aim at purely economic redistribution.  
However, the claim for a purely cognitive recognition in distinction to a moral recognition has 
allowed the conclusion that there must be different forms of recognition existent within 
human interaction, highlighting the possibility that changing the current form of recognition 
that leads to economic redistribution would also alter the form of redistribution. By drawing 
on Axel Honneth’s three patterns of intersubjective interaction, namely Love, Rights and 
Solidarity it was seen that the highest form of recognition is solidarity, in which humans 
mutually recognise each other as equal in status.104 From this it has been concluded that the 
misrecognition of the poor as not recognising them as status constitutes a violation of human 
rights and thus is unjust; which as a consequence makes recognition itself a vital component 
of justice. 
The relation of recognition as essential to justice could only be fully established by drawing 
on Nancy Fraser who rescinds claims for recognition as a mere politics of identity and 
difference, predominantly dedicated to an ethical focus on ‘the good life’ and thus in alleged 
anti-thesis to egalitarian redistributive justice, representing ‘the right’. Showing that 
recognition and redistribution cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenon of each other but are to 
be regarded as two sui generis and at the same time co-fundamental normative paradigms of 
justice, she conceptualises the ‘dual-axis of justice’.105  
A side effect of the integration of redistribution and recognition as normative paradigms of 
justice; is the creation of a middle ground cosmopolitan and communitarian claims. Through 
the definition of recognition as status equality and the resulting compatibility with 
redistribution it is at the same time possible to combine notions of cosmopolitanism which 
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seeks to grant equal standards for everyone with notions of communitarians that emphasise 
cultural diversity. This middle ground opens the door to a universalistic recognition of every 
human as equal but in possession of their own agency.  
 
Using equal status recognition in contrast to cognitive recognition, leads to redistribution 
based on solidarity that allows the poor to be recognised as moral equal subjects with equal 
status in social interaction. As a result, poverty policies in the notion of solidarity based 
redistribution have to recognise agency and focus on the empowerment of the poor. This 
theoretical outline has, through a practical illustration of the case of Fairtrade, been shown to 
enable a shift from a redistributive model that benefits the parties involved unequally and 
does not foster sustainable development to aid programmes designed with their active input 
that are adapted to their expressed differences and particularities. This moves the focus away 
from pure economic redistribution to context specific redistribution based on solidarity which 
itself leads to sufficient policies for the reduction of global poverty and outside the Fairtrade 
model might even imply a complete reassessment of global economic relations.  
 
(14,985 words)
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